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meshcentral-openclaw-bridge/SECURITY.md

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Security and safety requirements

Baseline

This bridge is a remote-management control plane. Treat its credentials and command path as highly sensitive.

Required controls

  • Use a dedicated MeshCentral account, never Rob’s primary administrator account.
  • Grant the minimum MeshCentral permissions needed for the current phase.
  • Keep the bridge on the trusted LAN or an isolated management network.
  • Do not expose MeshCentral, the bridge, or an MCP endpoint directly to the public internet.
  • Store secrets in a protected runtime secret store or environment file with restrictive permissions; never commit secrets.
  • Use TLS for connections where supported and validate certificates appropriately.
  • Authenticate and authorize every bridge request.
  • Restrict targets using explicit device/group allowlists.
  • Apply command allowlists or typed operations rather than accepting unrestricted shell text by default.
  • Log authentication events, requests, target, operation, confirmation, result, and timestamp without logging secrets.
  • Set timeouts, output limits, concurrency limits, and rate limits.
  • Fail closed when the bridge, MeshCentral, or authorization state is uncertain.
  • Provide a kill switch and documented rollback procedure.

Action classes

Class Examples Default policy
Read-only Inventory, status, uptime, disk usage, service state Allowed after authentication
Diagnostic execution Approved health checks, log collection, connectivity tests Targeted; explicit request; logged
Reversible change Restart an approved service, create a diagnostic bundle Immediate explicit confirmation
Disruptive change Reboot, shutdown, stop service, change network settings Explicit confirmation with impact shown
Destructive/high-risk Delete files, uninstall software, disable security, arbitrary scripts Disabled initially; separate approval/design required

OpenClaw-specific safety rule

Availability of a MeshCentral capability is not permission to use it. A state-changing operation requires Rob’s clear instruction and a confirmation immediately before execution. Ambiguous requests are clarification points, not authorization.

Threat model to review

  • Compromise of the bridge host or MeshCentral LXC
  • Theft or misuse of the integration credential
  • Prompt injection from endpoint output or device names
  • Accidental targeting of the wrong device or group
  • Command output containing secrets or personal data
  • Replay or duplicate execution of an action
  • MeshCentral/API version changes
  • Network partition or partial execution across multiple targets