Initial project documentation and status

2026-08-30 14:46:23 -04:00
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+# Security and safety requirements
+
+## Baseline
+
+This bridge is a remote-management control plane. Treat its credentials and command path as highly sensitive.
+
+## Required controls
+
+- Use a dedicated MeshCentral account, never Rob’s primary administrator account.
+- Grant the minimum MeshCentral permissions needed for the current phase.
+- Keep the bridge on the trusted LAN or an isolated management network.
+- Do not expose MeshCentral, the bridge, or an MCP endpoint directly to the public internet.
+- Store secrets in a protected runtime secret store or environment file with restrictive permissions; never commit secrets.
+- Use TLS for connections where supported and validate certificates appropriately.
+- Authenticate and authorize every bridge request.
+- Restrict targets using explicit device/group allowlists.
+- Apply command allowlists or typed operations rather than accepting unrestricted shell text by default.
+- Log authentication events, requests, target, operation, confirmation, result, and timestamp without logging secrets.
+- Set timeouts, output limits, concurrency limits, and rate limits.
+- Fail closed when the bridge, MeshCentral, or authorization state is uncertain.
+- Provide a kill switch and documented rollback procedure.
+
+## Action classes
+
+| Class | Examples | Default policy |
+|---|---|---|
+| Read-only | Inventory, status, uptime, disk usage, service state | Allowed after authentication |
+| Diagnostic execution | Approved health checks, log collection, connectivity tests | Targeted; explicit request; logged |
+| Reversible change | Restart an approved service, create a diagnostic bundle | Immediate explicit confirmation |
+| Disruptive change | Reboot, shutdown, stop service, change network settings | Explicit confirmation with impact shown |
+| Destructive/high-risk | Delete files, uninstall software, disable security, arbitrary scripts | Disabled initially; separate approval/design required |
+
+## OpenClaw-specific safety rule
+
+Availability of a MeshCentral capability is not permission to use it. A state-changing operation requires Rob’s clear instruction and a confirmation immediately before execution. Ambiguous requests are clarification points, not authorization.
+
+## Threat model to review
+
+- Compromise of the bridge host or MeshCentral LXC
+- Theft or misuse of the integration credential
+- Prompt injection from endpoint output or device names
+- Accidental targeting of the wrong device or group
+- Command output containing secrets or personal data
+- Replay or duplicate execution of an action
+- MeshCentral/API version changes
+- Network partition or partial execution across multiple targets